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VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING UNDER THE
KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE: ADOPTING U.S.
TECHNIQUES IN SOUTH KOREAN TRANSACTIONS
Eugene Kimt
Abstract: Because U.S. venture capital contracting techniques are well developed
and highly effective, the appeal of adopting such techniques in venture capital
transactions outside the United States is enormous to globally minded investors and legal
practitioners. South Korea has yet to develop venture capital contracting practices as
extensive as those found in the United States. In response to its burgeoning venture
capital industry, however, South Korea will likely continue to adopt U.S. venture capital
techniques in transactions governed by Korean corporate law. Such transactions can
benefit the South Korean venture capital industry, leading to more profitable investments
and financially successful companies operating on Korean soil.
Although the Korean Commercial Code ("KCC") is typically perceived as rigid and
ambiguous, it provides a sufficient legal framework under which virtually all of the
contracting techniques commonly used in U.S. venture capital transactions can be
implemented with varying degrees of success. Because transactions that are
impermissible under the KCC are generally regarded as null and void, the enforceability
of U.S. techniques under Korean law requires strict statutory compliance. Certain
notable differences therefore exist between venture capital contracting documentation in
South Korea and the United States. While such differences further reinforce the overall
desirability of adopting U.S. techniques in South Korean venture capital transactions, it
does not follow that these techniques are without legal force or effect. With careful
planning and drafting by legal practitioners, U.S. techniques can both achieve their
desired effect and comply with all relevant KCC provisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Venture capital' contracting in the United States can best be described
as a complex, relational process in which the financial incentives of venture
investors are aligned with the business interests of entrepreneurs through the
t M.P.A. 1998, School of International & Public Affairs, Columbia University; J.D. and LL.M in
Asian & Comparative Law expected in 2005, University of Washington School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff for
support and guidance and Professor June-Sun Choi, Young Su Shin, and Young Jae Shin for their valuable
comments. The author is also very grateful to Kenneth J. Lebrun. Any errors or omissions are the author's
own.
I The term "venture capital" is defined as investment by persons or entities in "high-growth, high-
risk, often high-technology firms that need [capital] to finance product or growth and that must, by the
nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity rather than debt." Peggy H. Fu,
Developing Venture Capital Laws in China: Lessons Learned from the United States, Germany, and Japan,
23 Loy. L.A. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 487, 490 (2001) (quoting Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson,
Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243,
245 (1998)).
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use of highly intricate contracting techniques. U.S. venture capital
contracting practices are well developed and have proven to be highly
effective domestically. 3  Accordingly, the appeal of adopting such U.S.
techniques in venture capital transactions outside the United States is
enormous, especially in countries where there is an active and sizeable
venture capital industry.
In the year 2000, South Korea had more than 7,000 venture
businesses, 5 the highest number in the world outside the United States.
Moreover, because of the percentage share of working adults employed in
new firms, South Korea "can claim to be the most entrepreneurial country in
the world.' '7 As of June 2001, domestic and foreign venture capitalists and
their funds invested over US$ 2.51 billion in 6012 Korean venture
8businesses.
Because of this explosive growth in investment opportunities in the
South Korean venture capital industry, the effective adoption of U.S. venture
capital contracting practices in South Korea could prove significant. While
2 This Comment examines legal incentive structures, specifically the complex legal contracting
techniques associated with U.S. venture capital contracting practices. For a discussion of U.S. venture
capital contracting practices, see generally George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of
Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1992); Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists
Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP:
LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY (Michael Whincop ed., Ashgate 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfin/SSRN-D280024-CodeOI0815520.pdf?abstractid=280024 (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004); Gilles Chemla et al., An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements, at
http://www.stem.nyu.edu/clb/02-001.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Klaus M. Schmidt, Convertible
Securities and Venture Capital Finance, Discussion Paper No. 2317, Centre for Economic Policy Research
(Dec. 1999) (on file with author).
3 Chemla, supra note 2, at 1-3; see generally George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the
World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 305 (2001). In addition to an effective and viable
commercial legal system, an active venture capital industry is defined as one that includes the following
key traits: (1) the existence of large, independent sources of funding; (2) liquidity through active stock
markets; (3) risk tolerance of the investors and entrepreneurs; and (4) labor mobility. See Curtis J.
Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative
Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 865, 880-93 (1997).
4 Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 865-67; see generally Eric C. Sibbitt, Law, Venture Capital, and
Entrepreneurism in Japan: A Microeconomic Perspective on the Impact of Law on the Generation and
Financing of Venture Businesses, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 61 (1998).
5 The term "venture business" or "venture company" in South Korea is technically used to refer to a
small-and-medium size enterprise ("SME") that has satisfied the relevant business requirements under the
Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses ("SMPVB"). SMPVB, Law No. 5381
(Aug. 28, 1997 as amended).
6 Min Hwa Lee, Founder-Kerean Venture Business Association-South Korea, Bus. WK., July 24,
2000, at 62.
7 See Entrepreneurial Fresh Air, ECONOMIST, available at http://www.economist.com (Jan. 11,
2001).
8 KOREAN VENTURE CAP. ASS'N, KOREAN VENTURE CAP. 9 (2001) [hereinafter KVC]. Since 2001,
however, the Korean venture capital industry has suffered setbacks after years of enormous growth. See An
Analysis of Korean Venture Capital, 2001 KOREAN VENTURE CAP. ASS'N Y.B. 9.
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South Korea's venture capital contracting practices have yet to reach the
degree of detail and complexity of those in the United States,9 various U.S.
techniques have been increasingly utilized in major Korean venture capital
transactions. 10 Incorporating these techniques into venture capital
transactions under Korean law can lead to more profitable investments and
financially successful companies operating on Korean soil.
Strict statutory compliance with the Korean Commercial Code
("KCC") I1 , however, is the necessary predicate upon which the use of U.S.
techniques depends. Without such compliance, no transaction is enforceable
and binding under Korean law. While fundamental principles of U.S.
corporate statutory and case law accommodate all of the contracting
techniques commonly used in venture capital transactions, 12 the extent to
which U.S. venture capital contracting techniques can be implemented under
the KCC statutory framework remains unclear. The KCC is generally
perceived as ambiguous and rigid when compared to its U.S. counterparts,
and what the KCC deems as impermissible is generally regarded as null and
void. 13
Despite limitations inherent in the KCC, this Comment asserts that the
KCC provides a sufficient legal framework under which the most commonly
9 See Haksoo Ko & Hyun Young Shin, Venture Capital in Korea? Special Law to Promote Venture
Capital Companies, 15 AM. U. INT'L REV. 457, 467-70 (2000). See also Anonymous, Venture Capital
Culture Can Help Build A New Economy, Bus. KOREA, May 2000, at 48-49 (noting that the Korean
venture capital industry has instead relied mainly on special laws and government policies pertaining to
venture businesses, including the Ethical Principles for Venture Capitalists drafted by the Korean Venture
Capital Association).
'o For instance, major Korean venture capital transaction agreements replicate the structure and
content of those typically found in the United States (sample South Korean venture capital documents are
on file with author).
" The KCC was enacted on January 20, 1962, and entered into force on January 1, 1963. The KCC
is comprised of 974 articles in five parts: General Provisions (Book I), Commercial Activities (Book II),
Companies (Book I), Insurance (Book IV), and Maritime Commerce (Book V). For selected English
translations of the KCC, see Korean Ministry of Government Legislation, English Translations of Selected
Korean Commercial Laws, at http://www.moleg.go.kr/index.htl (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
This Comment focuses on the statutory provisions contained in Chapter IV of Book Ill that
regulate the internal affairs and business transactions of Korean corporations, including those carried out by
most entrepreneurial, startup companies. See Hyun Yoo, To Form a Stock Corporation in Korea: A
Comparative Study with American Law, in Bus. LAWS IN KOREA 317, 319 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 1988).
12 See Dent, supra note 2, at 1078-82. But see Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A
Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 102
(1997) (stating that the structures of many venture-funded companies are not wholly dictated by the legal
fiamework in certain cases); William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 894-95 (2002) (noting that U.S. case law is hostile to venture
capital transactions and that an even-handed legal framework is necessary to deal with venture capital
contract peculiarities).
13 See Sang Hyun Song, Stock Corporation in Korea, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM OF KOREA 844 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983).
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used U.S. venture capital contracting techniques can be successfully
implemented.14 Close scrutiny of the relevant KCC provisions reveals that
with careful planning and precise legal drafting the U.S. techniques
employed in South Korean venture capital transactions can achieve their
desired effect while complying with all relevant KCC statutory provisions.
Inevitably, however, statutory compliance with the KCC will result in some
notable differences between venture capital documentation in South Korea
and the United States. While such differences may dissuade experienced
investors and promising entrepreneurs from relying on the U.S. techniques
when negotiating and structuring venture capital transactions in South Korea,
such techniques are not necessarily without legal force or effect.
Part II of this Comment provides a primer on contractual rights and
contracting techniques associated with convertible preferred stock, a
predominant financing vehicle in U.S. venture capital investments.'" Part III
explores the conceptual difficulties associated with implementing these U.S.
venture capital techniques under the KCC. Part IV analyzes the eight major
contracting techniques commonly used in U.S. venture capital transactions
under the KCC: 16 (1) liquidation and dividend preferences; (2) conversion
14 This Comment does not examine a series of special new post-October 1997 legislation specifically
implemented to promote venture companies in South Korea: (1) SMPVB, Law No. 5381 (Aug. 28, 1997 as
amended); (2) Act on Support for Small and Medium Enterprises Establishment, Law No. 6169 (Jan. 21,
2000 as amended); (3) Act on Framework on Small and Medium Enterprises, Law No. 4897 (Jan. 1, 1995
as amended); (4) Act on Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises and Encouragement of Purchases of
Their Products, Law No. 4825 (Dec. 22, 1994 as amended); (5) Act on Specialized Credit Financial
Business, Law No. 5374 (Aug. 28, 1997 as amended); (6) Act on Technology Development Promotion,
Law No. 6472 (May 24, 2001 as wholly amended); and (7) Act on Restriction of Special Taxation, Law No.
5584 (Dec. 28, 1998 as amended). Young Cheol Jeong, Korean Venture Business, Venture Capital, and
KOSDAQ, at http://www.wooyun.co.kr/down/ Korea%20Venture%2OBusiness,%2OVenture%2OCapital%
20and%2OKOSDAQ.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). The English-language versions of the legislation can
be located through Korean Legislation Research Institute, at http://152.99.45.21/english-version/
publication e.hlml (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
This Comment also does not examine or analyze other special supplemental statutes concerning
corporations incorporated under Korean jurisdiction. These statutes include: (1) the Securities and
Exchange Act (CHUNKWON KORAEPOP) (regulates primarily public, listed companies); (2) the Non-
Contentious Case Procedure Act (PISONG SAGON CHOLCH'APOP) (governs the formation of stock
corporations); (3) the Corporate Reorganization Act (HOESA CHONGRIPOP); (4) the Act for Enforcement of
the Commercial Code (SANGPOP SIHAENGPOP) (the procedural rules that interpret the statutory provisions
of the KCC); (5) the Banking Act (UNHAENGPOP); and (6) the Insurance Business Act (POHOMOPPOP).
These statutes either alter or supplement the statutory rules provided in the KCC.
15 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strtmberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, NATL BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER W7660,
13-14 (2000) at http://nber.org/papers/w7660 (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
16 The techniques can vary greatly from transaction to transaction. Despite great diversity in
contracting techniques, several are fairly standard and hence are examined in this Comment. This
Comment, however, does not discuss the validity or enforceability of terms or contents contained in such
techniques. Rather, it focuses upon their overall form and mechanics and discusses whether they can be
accommodated under the KCC.
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rights; (3) anti-dilution adjustment provisions; (4) share transfer restriction
provisions; (5) class voting rights; (6) supermajority voting rights; (7)
redemption rights; and (8) tag-along/drag-along rights. This Comment
concludes that all of these techniques can be accommodated in varying
levels by the KCC.
II. VENTURE CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES ASSOCIATED
WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
Venture capital transactions in the United States are characterized as
complex business transactions involving "active investment in private
companies with high growth potential.' 7  In a typical transaction, venture
investors receive convertible preferred stock 18 in exchange for making
equity investments in entrepreneurial companies. 19 Venture capital
transactions in the United States in the past forty years have produced some
of the world's leading companies, including Microsoft, Intel, Apple, Federal
Express, and Cisco Systems. 20  In the year 2000 alone, the U.S. venture
capital industry invested over US$ 90 billion in more than 5,000 transactions
in the United States.2'
Although the growth and size of this industry is impressive, the severe
incentive problems that accompany financing of young entrepreneurial
companies make these investments both difficult and risky.2 2 Generally
speaking, the problems of moral hazard,23 information asymmetry,24 and
17 See Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 875 (quoting William A. Sahlman, Insights from the Venture
Capital and the Oversight of Private Firms, 29 BUS. ECON. 35, 35 (1994)).
's Convertible preferred stock is a form of equity security that is "exchangeable by its terms at the
option of the holder, and under specified conditions, into another security, generally, but not always, into
[common stock] of the same company." RICHARD T. MCDERMOTr, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 351 (1985).
19 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR'S GUIDE TO BuSINESs
LAw 431 (2003).
20 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 2. Cf. KVC, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that successful and well-
established Korean companies such as Mirae Electronics, Medison, Appeal Telecom, Daum
Communication, Korea Link, and Jang Media were all beneficiaries of venture capital investment).
21 BAGLEY& DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 431.
22 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 134-36 (1998).
23 The moral hazard is generally defined as the likelihood that one or both of the involved parties to
an agreement will act contrary to the principles implied by the agreement. The entrepreneur and investors
work together toward building a successful company and they are compensated for this teamwork. In the
venture capital setting, the moral hazard problem is that the entrepreneur and investors have "an incentive
to shirk," which is derived from "the inability to monitor [each other] perfectly and compensate [the
entrepreneur and investors] on productivity." See D. Gordon Smith, Symposium, Team Production in
Venture Capital Investing, 24 IOwA J. CORP. L. 949, 960-63 (1999).
APRIL 2004
PACIFIC Rim LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
managerial opportunism 25 can engender deep-seated relational conflicts as
well as create serious diver Aence in original expectations between venture
investors and entrepreneurs.
To overcome such problems, the U.S. venture capital industry has
developed both contractual rights and contracting techniques associated with
convertible preferred stock.27 Contractual rights negotiated and obtained by
venture investors are crucial because they allow investors to protect, manage,
and ultimately liquidate their investments. Moreover, complex contracting
techniques utilized by U.S. venture capitalists are vital to preserving these
contractual rights in venture capital transactions. Such techniques are not
only instrumental tools in aligning the economic incentives and business
goals of investors and entrepreneurs, but are also highly effective legal
mechanisms through which proper and necessary written documentation of a
transaction can be accomplished.
A. Contractually Based Convertible Preferred Stock Rights Peculiar to
the U.S. Venture Capital Industry Are Essential in Incentivizing
Investors and Entrepreneurs
Venture investors essentially seek three types of rights when making
convertible preferred stock investments: investor protection, management
control, and investment exit. Each of these rights is essential in
incentivizing investors and entrepreneurs.
First, investor protection rights moderately protect equity capital
investments.28 They either provide downside protection in the form of a
capital investment return in the event of company failure, or upside
protection to ensure investors' full participation in any investment
24 Information asymmetry can be defined as the condition where at least some relevant information is
known to some but not all parties involved. In the venture capital context, information asymmetry can lead
to inefficient business decisions or outcomes because the investors have less business information and
technical knowledge than the entrepreneur. One reason is that the investors are "not involved in the day-to-
day managing of the venture and will not have first-hand knowledge of how much time and effort the
entrepreneur[s] [are] dedicating to the venture." See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic
Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 45, 56-57
(2002).
2 The problem of managerial opportunism arises when an investor "sometimes promises to perform
value-added services but later attempts to renegotiate this promise at a stage in the company's development
when the entrepreneur has reduced bargaining power." See Smith, supra note 22, at 134-35.
2 See Utset, supra note 24, at 85-87; Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small Firm Financing Problem:
Private Information and Public Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 177, 180-84 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 12, at 939-44; BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 445-46.
28 BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 446-48.
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appreciation, should the company succeed. 29 Examples of techniques used
to implement investor protection rights include liquidation and dividend
preferences, mandatory/optional conversion rights, anti-dilution adjustment
provisions (including pre-emptive rights), and share transfer restriction
rights.30
Second, management control rights permit venture investors to assert
negative control over certain corporate affairs conducted by management.31
They also empower investors to manage and oversee major, substantive
business operations as the company moves forward.32 In particular, contract
negotiations for special supplemental voting rights 33 entitle investors to
assert veto-like control over certain corporate decisions and actions taken by
the board of directors.34
Third, investment exit rights entitle investors to liquidate their
investments for profit.35 Depending on the company's success, exercising
such rights allows investors to sell their convertible preferred shares to the
public in an initial public offering ("IPO"),36 to other outside investors, a
potential buyer of the company,37 or even back to the entrepreneurs, or the
company itself.38 In the United States, these investment exit rights are often
negotiated and documented through contracting techniques generally known
as registration rights, 39 tag-along/drag-along rights, 40 and redemption
rights.4 '
29 Id. at 445-47; see also Delaware State Bar Association, Special Feature, Seminar on New
Ventures: Organization, Financing and Operations, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 253, 278 n.35 (1985).
30 See discussion infra Part IV.A.I-A.4.
31 Utset, supra note 24, at 61-62. For example, if the preferred stock investors possess certain class
voting rights, the entrepreneurs cannot sell their enterprise to an outside third party or elect the board of
directors without obtaining the approval of such investors. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 465-
66 32 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1067, 1081-83 (2003).
33 See discussion infra Part IV.B.I-B.2.
34 See Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, supra note 15, at 15-16.
35 See Gilson, supra note 32, at 1091.
36 Smith, supra note 23, at 972.
37 See Smith, supra note 12, at 131-32.
3s Id.; Gilson, supra note 32, at 1075.
39 This Comment does not analyze registration rights under the KCC. Registration rights are not
discussed because the KCC contains no governing statutory provisions directly applicable to registration
rights. The Korean Securities Act provisions and over-the-counter stock exchange rules are the main
sources of rules and regulations governing how the investors structure and document the terms and
conditions of investor registration rights. The full text of KOSDAQ Rules can be found at
http://www.ksda.or.kr (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
40 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
41 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 1. In a less successful investment exit scenario, where a handsome
profit cannot be realized, the investors typically exercise redemption rights to sell their preferred shares
back to the entrepreneurs, usually four or five years after their initial purchase.
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In theory, each of these contractual rights associated with convertible
preferred stock help align the financial objectives of the investor with those
of the entrepreneur by incentivizing efficient business behaviors as the
venture business moves forward.42 Without such rights, most entrepreneurs
would likely turn to friends and family for funds, and venture investors
would be limited to simple, traditional forms of debt-like investment
vehicles. 43  Unlike traditional debt-like preferred stock issued by large,
publicly-held companies, convertible preferred stock bearing contractual
rights help create the necessary relational contract between investors and
entrepreneurs.44
B. U.S. Contracting Techniques Associated with Convertible Preferred
Stock Are Indispensable in Completing Successful Venture Capital
Transactions
To structure and document investors' contractual rights in venture
capital transactions, the U.S. venture capital industry has developed a unique
set of complex contracting techniques associated with convertible preferred
stock.45 Such techniques are employed in virtually all major U.S. venture
46
capital transactions. The techniques most commonly used in U.S. venture
capital transactions are: (1) liquidation and dividend preferences; (2)
conversion rights; (3) anti-dilution adjustment provisions; (4) share transfer
restriction provisions; (5) class voting rights; (6) supermajority voting rights;
(7) redemption rights; and (8) tag-along/drag-along rights.4 Ensuring the
overall success of a convertible preferred stock investment depends
significantly upon the contracting parties' effective use of such legal
contracting techniques.
42 Ko & Shin, supra note 9, at 462-63; see also Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 886-87. For a theoretical
modeling of the alignment process, see Francesca Comelli & Oved Yasha, Stage Financing and the Role of
Convertible Debt, LONDON Bus. SCH. WORKING PAPER 253 (1997), at http://papers.ssm.com/
abstract48581 (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
43 Klausner & Litvak, supra note 2, at 15.
" See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 886.
4 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 445-66. In the United States, for example, the issuance
of convertible preferred stock is specifically authorized by § 519 of the New York Business Corporation
Law ("NYBCL"), N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 519, New York State Assembly, New York State Consolidated
Laws, available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?cl=13&a=6 (last visited Feb. 1, 2004), and by § 151(e)
of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (Aspen Law &
Business 2000).
46 See generally Paul Gompers & Josh Lemer, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J. L. & ECON. 463 (1996); Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 15, at 14-
24.
47 BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 445-66, 471.
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The overall function of these contracting techniques is two-fold. First,
these techniques organize and preserve the carefully negotiated details of
contractual rights between investors and entrepreneurs, and align the parties'
respective financial objectives and incentives. 48  Their effective use is the
first step toward establishing a direct and ongoing bilateral relationship
between the investors and entrepreneurs.49 Second, the techniques allow the
parties to easily document their respective rights in a formal written
agreement.50 Each technique takes the form of either provisions in the
venture company's articles of incorporation or contractual provisions in one
or more shareholder agreements entered into by and among the
entrepreneurs and investors. 5 In the United States, the techniques are
always structured and documented with respect to state corporation and
federal tax laws. 52  Similarly, they are enforced by the U.S. court system.
53
The following diagram illustrates venture capital contracting process
in the United States:
4 See generally Gilson, supra note 32.
49 See Dent, supra note 2, at 1044.
so See BAGLEY & DAucHY, supra note 19, at 445.
5' Id. In general, these techniques are a set of legal tools or devices by which the convertible
preferred stock rights (i.e., investor protection, management control and investment exit rights) are defined
and structured. The articles of incorporation and private shareholder agreements essentially constitute two
principal legal methods used in documenting the techniques peculiar to U.S. venture capital contracting.
Certain techniques are not typically documented in a company's articles of incorporation but will
be established in one or more private contracts known as shareholder agreements. A shareholder
agreement may appear in the form of: (1) stock purchase agreement; (2) registration rights agreement; (3)
voting agreements; (4) investors' rights agreement; (5) right of first refusal; and (6) co-sale agreement (as
indicated by sample U.S. venture capital documents) (examples of such agreements are on file with author).
52 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 876-77 (2003) (stating that U.S.
federal tax law impacts the overall structure of venture capital agreements); see Smith, supra note 12, at
134, n.239 (citing Katherine M. Todd, Blue Sky Issues for Venture-Backed Companies, in VENTuRE
CAprrAL 1991, 111 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 583, 1991)).
53 For case law on the enforceability of venture capital contracts, see, e.g., Orban v. Field, No. 12820,
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040
(Del. Ch. 1997).
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U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING PROCESS
EQUITY INVESTMENT,
REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL, AND
MANAGERIAL ASSISTANCE
FVENTURE CAPITAUSTS/INVESTORS E ENTREPRENEURS I
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CARRYING
RIGHTS THAT OFFER INVESTOR
PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT CONTROL,
AND/OR INVESTMENT EXT MECHANISMS
STRUCTUREDFANDIEOSCNTE LMENTD THROUGH UCOMPLEX TECHNIQUES PECULIAR TO
U.S VENTURE CAPITAL CONERKACTING
•VIA AMENDMENTS TO THE ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION OF THE COMPANY
•VIA PRIVATE SHAREHOLDER
AGREEMENTS ENTER INTO By AND
AMONG ENTR EPRENEURS, VENTURE
INVESTORS AND OTHER PARTIES
111. THE KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE EXAMINED: UNDERSTANDING BASIC
DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING U.S. VENTURE
CAPITAL CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES UNDER KOREAN LAW
In light of their value to both investors and entrepreneurs, U.S.
venture capital contracting techniques that structure and implement the
contractual rights attached to convertible preferred stock would benefit the
South Korean venture capital industry. A simple transplantation of U.S.
techniques to South Korea is highly unlikely, however, because the U.S.
techniques must fully comply with the pertinent KCC statutory provisions to
have proper legal effect.54
The KCC poses at least three conceptual obstacles to the effective
implementation of the U.S. techniques under Korean law. First, the KCC
appears to insufficiently accommodate many of the complex contracting
techniques found in U.S. venture capital transactions. Second, because
statutory compliance with the KCC is mandatory, failure to do so may
render U.S. techniques invalid and transactions that employ them
See supra note 11.
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unenforceable. Lastly, although private contractual agreements can be used
to contract around KCC provisions, their overall efficacy is uncertain.
A. The KCC Fails to Sufficiently Accommodate Many of the Complex
Contracting Techniques Found in U.S. Venture Capital Transactions
Effective accommodation of U.S. techniques in South Korea is
hindered by the KCC's Companies Law section, which is designed primarily
to regulate large corporations." Venture enterprises or entrepreneurial
companies are typically small, closely held corporations, which by their
unique nature, conduct their affairs and transactions differently from their
larger counterparts. 56 Accordingly, the KCC appears ill-equipped to deal
adequately with the complex contractual nature of U.S. venture capital
transactions.
U.S. jurisprudence has accommodated the special needs of private,
closely held corporations in several significant ways. 57 First, U.S. courts
have recognized the need for greater contractual freedom among
shareholders of such corporations. 58 Second, many U.S. states have
statutory provisions designed specifically for closely held corporations.
Such provisions contained in the so-called close corporation statutes permit
private, closely held corporations "more flexibility in corporate governance"
and "an increased degree of protection for minority shareholders., 60  The
statutes effectively allow such corporations to carry out corporate activities
or transactions that would otherwise be deemed invalid or unlawful.
Neither of these solutions, however, is available under Korean law.
Many KCC provisions are silent with respect to the legal effects of U.S.
'3 Interview with Junesun Choi, Professor of Law, Sungkyunkwan University, in Seattle, Wash.
(Feb. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Choi interview]; see also Yoo, supra note 11, at 323-24 (stating that the KCC
was implemented and revised in view of particular business-related requirements of modem stock
corporations).
See Smith, supra note 12, at 103-04.
57 See JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 696-700 (4th ed. 1995); see
Dennis S. Kasiala, An Analysis ofClose Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663,
668-72 (1989).
58 See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E. 2d 577, 27-28 (Il1. 1964) (noting that a "sound basis for
[shareholder] protection [in a close corporation] is afforded by a ... shareholder agreement securing the
rights and obligations of all [shareholders]); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype ofNew England, Inc., 328 N.E.
2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975) (finding that a close corporation "bears striking resemblance to a partnership" in
which shareholders are "dependent on one another for the success of the enterprise").
59 CHOPER ET AL., supra note 57, at 698.
60 See Baruch Gitlin, When is Corporation Close, or Closely-Held, Corporation Under Common or
Statutory Law, 111 A.L.R. 5th 207, 2a (2003 West Group).
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techniques used in most venture capital transactions. 6 As a result, the KCC
statutory provisions relevant to venture capital transactions are likely to be
interpreted as "unaccommodating" when compared to their U.S.
counterparts.6 2
B. Because Statutory Compliance with the KCC is Mandatory, Failure to
Comply May Render US. Techniques Invalid and Transactions that
Employ Them Unenforceable
Effective implementation of U.S. venture capital contracting
techniques might also be problematic because such techniques require strict,
mandatory compliance with relevant KCC provisions. 63  Failure to fully
comply with the KCC may render a corporate charter or shareholder
agreement provision invalid and unenforceable. In direct contrast to the
general U.S. policy toward greater contractual freedom in corporate law,
64
the KCC's statutory articles are generally mandatory or unconditionally
binding 65 unless provided otherwise in the statutory language.
66
Because most Korean venture businesses or entrepreneurial
companies are likely to be formed as joint stock companies,67 any effective
61 At the moment, there is virtually no in-depth scholarship exploring this topic. See, e.g., Stephen J.
Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Exploring the Need for International Harmonization: Establishing a New Stock
Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 277, 286-87 (2002) (stating in
general that "some residual uncertainty exists as to what extent [the Korean] Commercial Code... gives
[corporations] the ability to bind themselves through the corporate charter"). Cf. Donald P. Swisher, Use of
Shareholder Agreements and Other Control Techniques in Japanese Joint Venture Corporations and Their
Validity Under Japanese Corporate Law, 9 INT'L Law. 159, 159-63 (1975) (examining comparable
techniques used in U.S./Japanese joint ventures and concluding that their overall effectiveness under the
Japanese Commercial Code is uncertain).
62 Choi interview, supra note 55.
63 Id.
6 For a discussion of prominent U.S. scholarly works concerning greater contractual freedom in U.S.
corporate law, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989)
(containing seven articles written by well-known U.S. scholars including Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R.
Fischel, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Fred S. McChesney, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Roberta Romano, John C. Coffee,
Jr.).
65 Song, supra note 13, at 844.
66 For instance, KCC Article 368 provides the following beginning clause: "[u]nless as otherwise
provided by this Act or the articles of incorporation... " Such a clause has been construed as permitting
the company's articles of incorporation to provide optional or supplemental rules. Choi interview, supra
note 55.
67 See June-sun Choi, The Organizational Structure of Stock Corporation in Korea: The Disparity
Between Law and Practice, 22 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 1, 1,3 (Dec. 1994) (estimating that in 1991 over 90
percent of all South Korean companies ("JUSIK-HOESA") were joint stock companies). See also Sang Hyun
Song, Is Chusik Hoesa Better than Yunhan Hoesa for Foreign Investment?, in KOREAN LAW IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 586 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1996) (stating that, relative to other corporate forms, joint
stock companies maintain greater prestige in the Korean business community. Furthermore, Korean
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implementation of the U.S. technique involving the company must strictly
comply with the KCC's provisions governing joint stock companies.
Accordingly, unlike a provision in a private shareholder agreement, a U.S.
technique in the form of a provision in an articles of incorporation" would
be held unenforceable if it violated one or more governing statutory
provisions of the KCC.69
Moreover, companies incorporated under Korean law cannot opt out
of the KCC statutory framework. 70  The KCC is the primary source of
Korean corporate law,71 and is the main statutory body of law that governs
and regulates the existence, organization, and conduct of profit-making
companies. 72 Just as a U.S. corporation is subject to the corporation law of
the state where it is incorporated,73 virtually every corporate action or
business-related transaction carried out by a joint stock company established
on Korean soil is subject to the application of the KCC.74 As a result, most
South Korean venture capital transactions must be implemented under the
KCC or be subject to voidance.
C. Although Private Contractual Agreements Can be Used to Contract
Around KCC Provisions, Their Efficacy is Uncertain
Because venture capital techniques in the United States are often
implemented through private contractual shareholder agreements, 75 Korean
venture investors and entrepreneurs may, in a similar fashion, contract
around mandatory KCC statutory provisions. The efficacy of private
contractual agreements which run contrary to the KCC, however, is
uncertain.
investors usually prefer the joint stock company form because of the widespread belief that it is more
favorably received by the general public.).
68 In the United States, when venture capital techniques are documented as provisions in the
company's article- of incorporation, the techniques must generally comply with the applicable state
corporate law. See Dent, supra note 2, at 1078-82.
69 Song, supra note 65, at 843-44.
70 Choi interview, supra note 55.
71 See supra note 11.
72 See Michael Dirkis, Company Law in Korea, in COMPANY LAW IN EAST ASIA 83 (Roman Tomasic
ed., 1999).
73 With respect to corporate organization, governance, administration, and dissolution, Korean joint
stock companies closely resemble U.S. stock corporations. Song, supra note 13, at 829.
74 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 319 (stating that this conclusion is derived from KCC Articles 3, 5, and
47). Alternatively, for foreign companies wishing to carry out business transactions in South Korea,
Article 617 of the KCC reads: "[a] company incorporated in a foreign country shall, if it has established its
principal office in the Republic of Korea or its main purpose is to engage in business in the Republic of
Korea, be subject to the same provisions as a company incorporated in the Republic of Korea."
75 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 445.
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Enforceability of such contracts is currently questionable because the
KCC is silent with respect to their validity.76 In direct contrast, U.S. law
expressly permits the use of private contractual agreements among
shareholders of closely held companies. 7 Hence, a shareholder agreement
made privately between entrepreneurs and investors in South Korea may be
unenforceable under Korean law if it contravenes the mandatory statutory
provisions.78
Most Korean scholars, however, concede that there is a finite limit to
the KCC's mandatory nature. Prominent Korean law professor Sang Hyun
Song states:
[T]he systematic character of the [Korean] Commercial Code
tends to support the theory that the rules are mandatory only in
intra-corporate structure and only with respect to corporate
action as such. Accordingly, then, although the law treats the
rules of corporate control as generally imperative, it has at the
same time little difficulty in holding that in their separate, non-
corporate spheres, contract[ual] [agreements] between the
parties are both valid and enforceable at least for damages. 79
Accordingly, a particular contracting technique that would violate one or
more KCC articles, if documented in the articles of incorporation, does not
necessarily violate the KCC when made as part of a private contractual
agreement.
Nevertheless, such a conclusion must be qualified. Most scholars
agree that no legal effect may be given to contractual provisions found in a
private shareholder agreement where the provisions' conflicting
inconsistency with relevant KCC statutory articles essentially falls within the
80sphere of intra-corporate affairs or company structure. In particular, the
76 Yoo, supra note 11, at 349.
77 See, e.g., MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT, § 7.32 (American Bar Association 1999)
[hereinafter MBCA] (detailing the character of shareholder agreements, permitting shareholders to create
contractual voting agreements, and providing shareholders with the contractual right to negotiate
agreements among themselves); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 218, 354 (stating that "no written agreement
among stockholders of a close corporation ... shall be invalid on the ground that it is an attempt ... by the
shareholders . .. to arrange relations among [them] ... and the corporation in a manner that would be
appropriate only among partners").8 For example, Professor Sang Hyun Song states, "contractual restrictions on share transfer
seemingly violative of the [KCC] are not considered valid and enforceable by most Korean legal scholars."
Song, supra note 13, at 843.
7 Song, supra note 13, at 844.
so Choi interview, supra note 55. Although there is little or no research upon which to base this
assertion, Korean scholars concur with this view. Id.
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validity and enforceability of private shareholder agreements depends on
whether the venture company is a party to the agreement and if any outside
parties, including shareholders other than the investors and entrepreneurs,
are affected by the agreement.8 '
In the Korean venture capital context, this is significant because
investors and entrepreneurs often confront the dilemma of choosing the most
appropriate documentation method for each particular technique used-
either the articles of incorporation or separate private shareholder
agreements. With enforceability hanging in the balance, it becomes
paramount that legal practitioners in South Korea plan and draft venture
capital agreements extremely carefully.
IV. UTILIZING U.S. TECHNIQUES IN SOUTH KOREAN VENTURE CAPITAL
TRANSACTIONS: A BRIEF ExAMINATION OF THEIR EFFECTIVE
ADOPTION UNDER THE KCC STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Despite the KCC's inherent limitations, virtually all of the venture
capital contracting techniques commonly used in U.S. venture capital
transactions can be accommodated in South Korea. The eight techniques
commonly used to implement investor protection rights, supplemental
management control rights, and investment exit rights in U.S. venture capital
transactions should be carefully structured and drafted to conform with the
relevant statutory provisions contained in the KCC.
A. Techniques Used to Implement Investor Protection Rights:
Liquidation and Dividend Preferences, Conversion Rights, Anti-
Dilution Provisions, and Share Transfer Restrictions
Investors usually seek to secure important protection rights relating to
their convertible preferred stock investments. 82 The common techniques
used to structure and document such rights in the United States are: (1)
liquidation and dividend preferences; 8 3 (2) conversion rights; 84 (3) anti-
dilution adustment provisions; 85 and (4) share transfer restriction
provisions. In South Korea, each of these techniques can be adopted to
a' Interview with Young Su Shin and Young Jae Shin, Attorneys at Law at the Korean law firm of
Yoon & Yang, in Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Shin interview].
82 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 446-49.
83 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
84 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.85 See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
6 See discussion infra Part IV.A.4.
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both protect investors' rights and simultaneously meet the KCC's statutory
requirements.
1. Liquidation and Dividend Preferences
a. General treatment in the United States: liquidation and dividend
preferences provide the most basic level of downside protection for
investors
Liquidation and dividend preferences afford venture investors the
most basic level of protection against investment failure.87 In the event of a
liquidation88 or dissolution of the company, a liquidation preference requires
that the preferred stockholders (i.e., the venture capitalists/venture capital
investors) be given priority over the common stockholders (i.e., the
entrepreneurs) for monetary payments upon a liquidation or dissolution of
the company. 9 In general, the liquidation preference becomes attached to
the investors' preferred stock through the articles of incorporation.9"
A dividend preference allows the investors' convertible preferred
stock to earn a dividend at some modest rate. 91 Because virtually no
dividend payments are declared by boards of directors in the venture capital
context, however, the dividend preference reaps few benefits for the
investors. 92 The dividend preference only becomes meaningful when the
investors obtain cumulative dividends, 9 which are mandatory periodic
dividends that accrue if unpaid. 94 Adopting a cumulative dividend policy as
part of the dividend preference ensures that the investors receive some rate
of return on the investment even if the venture-backed company ultimately
fails.95 In most cases, the dividend preference is standardized in the form of
provisions in the articles of incorporation.
96
87 See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 52, at 883-85.
88 In the venture capital context, the definition of "liquidation" is "typically broad enough to include
any sale of the business or sale of substantially all of the company's assets." BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra
note 19, at 449.
89 Id.
9o Indicated by sample U.S. venture capital agreements (on file with author).
91 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 449-50. Typically, the dividend rate is set at six to
eight percent per annum.92 Id.
93 See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 52, at 882-83.
94 BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 450.
95 Id.
96 Indicated by sample U.S. venture capital agreements (on file with author).
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b. Implementation under KCC: Article 344 gives proper implicit
authorization for the use of liquidation and dividend preferences
Both liquidation and dividend preferences are available to investors
under the KCC.97 Article 344 specifically provides that "a company may
issue two or more classes of shares which are different in respect to their
particulars as to the dividends of profits or interest or distribution of the
residual assets."98 First, this language implies that the board of directors can
set particular preferences for asset distributions in the event of liquidation.99
Second, the KCC specifically provides that convertible preferred stock,
relative to the common stock, may bear dividends. 00 Both dividend and
liquidation preferences, as well as any adopted cumulative dividend
preferences, should be included in the articles of incorporation. 101
With respect to dividend preference, however, Article 344 requires
that a company set a minimum dividend in its articles of incorporation that
will be granted to preferred stockholders. 10 2 This minimum rule can be
problematic should the parties adopt dividend preferences in the venture
capital context because such dividend payments would force them to spend
much-needed equity capital. At least one Korean scholar, however, argues
that not all preferred stock with dividend preference must comport with this
minimum requirement. 103 Accordingly, under this scheme, the venture
companies would not be subject to the minimum dividend rule where
preferred investors instead obtain liquidation preferences.
Liquidation and dividend preferences should be implemented with
care. Because the company is a party, the liquidation preferences should be
in the articles of incorporation to have legal effect. 104 Provisions contained
97 KCC, art. 344.
98 Id.
99 Id. But see Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects
on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 305, n.168 (2000). Professor Kim states
that liquidation preference has been of no practical use in South Korea because no preferred share
distribution existed in the case of liquidation upon dissolution.
100 KCC, art. 344, para 1. See also Kim, supra note 99, at 306, n.169. Prior to the 1995 amendment
to the KCC, dividend preferences for preferred stock offered minimal benefit because the dividend rate was
typically determined by adding only one percent to the dividends typically given to common stock.
101 Choi interview, supra note 55.
'0, KCC, art. 344, para. 2. See also Kim, supra note 99, at 306-07. The statutory imposition of
minimum dividends on preferred shareholders seeks to increase the appeal of preferred stock and
encourage higher dividend payments to preferred stockholders.
:03 Kim, supra note 99, at 307.
'04 Shin interview, supra note 81.
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in a company's charter would bind not only all shareholders, but also the
corporation itself. 
105
2. Conversion Rights
a. General treatment in the United States: conversion rights are crucial
in allowing investors to liquidate their preferred stock investments
The right of conversion allows a shareholder to convert preferred
stock into common stock. 10 6 This conversion can occur either at the option
of the shareholder or upon the occurrence of certain events (automatic
conversion rights). 107 The so-called "right to convert" gives investors
common stock in exchange for forgoing their preferred stock upon some
objective evidence of their investment's success-usually the closing of an
IPO that meets certain criteria. 108 Such rights may also be automatically
triggered by an affirmative vote of a majority or supermajority of the
preferred stockholders. 10 9 Upon conversion, the investors usually liquidate
the new, converted shares of common stock in the public securities market
for handsome profits." 10
b. Implementation under the KCC: conversion rights can be freely
implemented, but must satisfy prescribed statutory requirements
Although conversion rights can be freely implemented in South Korea,
the KCC imposes several important statutory requirements on convertible
shares. Article 346 specifically requires that a company provide
shareholders the statutory right to convert their shares of one class into
shares of another class, if and when different classes of shares are issued."'
The same article also prescribes that the company's articles of incorporation
provide the following: the number and contents of the shares to be issued as
a result of the share conversion, the conditions of the conversion, and the
period when the conversion may be demanded." 2 These requirements can
represent a special challenge to legal practitioners in South Korea.
105 Id.
106 BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 455.
'0' Id. at 455-56.
'08 See Triantis, supra note 3, at 317-18.
109 BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 456.
Ito See Smith, supra note 23, at 972.
'" See KCC, art. 346.
112 id.
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Using conversion rights under Korean law requires additional
considerations as well. Article 348 provides that in the case of share
conversion, "the issue price of such new shares shall be that of the shares
which existed before the conversion." ' 1 3 KCC Article 346(2) provides that a
company should "reserve a sufficient number of shares to be issued in
consequence of share conversion."1 14 Legal practitioners should also take
notice of KCC Articles 347 through 350, which list other technical
requirements related to share conversion. 15 Without strict compliance with
these articles, share conversions may be deemed null and void. 6 Drafting
efforts regarding share conversion rights in South Korean venture capital
transactions should also take into account any current government regulation,
as well as stock exchange and over-the-counter listing rules. 1 7 The
enforcement of such rules and regulations may affect the terms and
conditions of conversion rights negotiated between investors and
entrepreneurs."1
8
3. Anti-Dilution
a. General treatment in the United States: anti-dilution techniques and
preemptive rights provide modest protection against structural
devaluation of convertible preferred stock investments
Anti-dilution techniques provide modest protection against possible
dilution of venture investors' convertible preferred stock. 119 These
techniques can be grouped into two broad categories: structural anti-dilution
adjustments and preemptive rights. Structural anti-dilution adjustments are
usually documented because they provide protection of investors' preferred
stock against share dilution caused by certain issuances of investors'
preferred stock.' 20 They ensure that-in the event of stock splits, reverse
splits, stock dividends, and other recapitalizations-the number of shares of
"3 KCC, art. 348.
"4 KCC, art. 346, para. 2.
"s See KCC, art. 347-50.
"6 Choi interview, supra note 55; Shin interview, supra note 81.
17 In case of an automatic share conversion on an IPO, there may be supplemental rules or
regulations that govern the terms of automatic share conversion in South Korea. Shin interview, supra note
81. Similarly, in the United States, sales of converted common stock may be subject to certain exemptions
under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Smith, supra note 12, at 138-40 and
accomanying notes.
t Shin interview, supra note 81.
"9 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 456-64.
"20 Id. at 456-57.
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common stock issuable upon conversion of the preferred stock represents the
same percentage of ownership that existed prior to such recapitalization .12
Such adjustments also offer investors some price protection from subsequent
issuances of preferred stock to other parties at a lower price than the
investors initially paid.1
22
A preemptive right entitles a shareholder to purchase his or her pro
rata share in any new, subsequent share issuance to ensure that the original
investors maintain their percentage ownership. 123 This type of provision is
typically a contractual provision in a venture capital shareholder
agreement, 124 but can be a provision in the articles of incorporation as
well.'
25
b. Implementation under the KCC: anti-dilution provisions are fully
enforceable, while statutory preemptive rights can be overridden by
the board of directors under limited circumstances
In South Korea, both anti-dilution adjustments and preemptive rights
are available under the KCC. While the KCC does not provide specific
provisions concerning structural anti-dilution adjustments, contracting
parties in South Korea almost always set their particular terms and contents
in the articles of incorporation or private contractual agreements.
126
Unlike U.S. corporation law, the KCC provides statutory preemptive
rights.' 27 KCC Article 418 contains provisions designed to ensure that every
shareholder has the right of preemption over new share issuances. 28 The
same article, however, provides an important qualifying exemption: that the
company may-under provisions in its articles of incorporation-"make an
allotment of shares to persons other than existing shareholders to the extent
121 id.
12 See, e.g., Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in Burnout/Cramdown
Financings, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 593, 595 (1995).
123 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 458; see also Dent, supra note 2, at 1055.
124 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 458.
125 A preemptive right is not an inherent aspect of share ownership, but rather a right that may be
granted or withheld by the articles of incorporation. See MBCA § 6.30. It provides that "the shareholders
of a corporation do not have a preemptive right to acquire the corporation's unissued shares except to the
extent [that] the articles of incorporation so provide."
126 Choi interview, supra note 55.
127 KCC, art. 418. The article states that "each shareholder has the right to the allotment of new
shares in proportion to the number of shares which [he or she] holds."
128 Id.; Shin interview, supra note 81. KCC Article 418 is a firther extension of the policy concept of
shareholder equality under the Korean corporate law.
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necessary for the achievement of the company's financial objective.'' 129
Accordingly, the board of directors may override the statutory preemptive
rights held by investors if such exemption language is specifically contained
in the articles of incorporation. When the articles provide, the company
management can issue and sell a substantial number of shares to third parties,
thereby decreasing the existing investors' percentage of share ownership.
Venture capital investors in South Korea thus have statutory
preemptive rights, unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.
One way to eliminate statutory preemptive rights is to rely on a contractual
provision in a private shareholder agreement and at the same time insert a
charter provision providing for the elimination of any shareholder
preemptive rights. This would allow the investors and entrepreneurs to
decide among themselves which particular shareholders should have
preemptive rights.13
0
4. Share Transfer Restrictions
a. General treatment in the United States: share transfer restrictions
help control the identities of shareholders by requiring prior consent
of investors in share sales
Virtually all venture capital transactions in the United States utilize
share transfer restriction provisions to control the identity of the company's
shareholders. 131 Such provisions are essentially limitations or prohibitions
on the persons or entities to whom shareholders may transfer their stock,
"the time periods during which the stock may be transferred, or the manner
in which the stock may be transferred."'
132
Prohibitions or restrictions on share transfers generally prohibit
entrepreneurs from transferring or selling their shares without the prior
129 Id. at para. 2. This particular statutory exception might have been created in an attempt to prevent
abusive practices of controlling shareholders-in forcing existing shareholders to buy new issuances or to
minimize the risk of losing shareholding control of the company.
"0 KCC Article 418(2) is likely to be immensely significant in the venture capital context because
without this exemption a company may not be able to issue the necessary amount of preferred stock as
requested by different, additional investors (from subsequent transactions or financings) due to the exercise
of preemptive rights on the part of existing investors. Choi interview, supra note 55. Cf. BAGLEY &
DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 458 (describing how preemptive rights may give rise to such similar problems
in the United States).
131 See, e.g., John C. Mcllwraith, The Outlook for the Private Equity Market, 51 CASE W. RES. L. Rev.
423, 432 (2001).
132 STANLEY FOSTER REED & ALEXANDRA REED LAJOux, THE ART OF M&A: THE ACQUISITION
BUYOUT GUIDE 497 (McGraw-Hill Trade) (3d ed. 1998).
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consent of all other shareholders, including the venture capital investors. 133
Restrictions on share transferability typically appear in the form of
provisions in a private shareholder agreement' 34 and are usually considered
valid and enforceable in the United States.1
35
b. Implementation under the KCC: because the KCC can trump contract
principles, share transfer restrictions are of limited use
Share transfer restrictions may be of limited use in South Korea
because KCC Article 335 provides that shares may be freely transferred to
other persons. 136 Although share transfer restrictions in a shareholder
agreement are generally enforceable under the Korean Civil Code's freedom
of contract doctrine, the KCC can limit the overall effect of such
provisions.' 37  For example, if an investor transfers his or her shares in
breach of a contractual provision in such an agreement, and the transferee
legally obtains the shares in accordance with relevant KCC provisions, the
transfer in breach of the shareholder agreement is not prohibited under the
KCC. 138 While the investor who transfers his or her shares in violation of
contractual transfer restrictions would be subject to potential shareholder
claims for money damages, 139 the transfer would not be unwound. 140
Because the KCC in essence trumps contract principles, the overall
effectiveness of private agreement-based restriction provisions are limited
under Korean law.
If a private shareholder agreement is not used, and share transfer
restrictions are instead adopted in the articles of incorporation, the KCC may
impose conditional statutory restrictions on share transfers. KCC Article
335 provides that the articles of incorporation may adopt optional provisions
3 Kenneth J. Lebrun, Making a Private Equity/Venture Capital Investment in Japan: Implementing
Techniues Commonly Used in U.S. Transactions, 23 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 213, 237-38 (2002).
See Mcllwraith, supra note 131.
13' See, e.g., MBCA § 6.27. See also REED & LAJOUX, supra note 132 (stating that their validity and
enforceability are based on the assumption "that there is a valid business purpose for the restriction, the
restriction is reasonably related to a business purpose, and no shareholder has been induced by deception or
forced into agreeing to the restriction"); Lebrun, supra note 133, at 238 (stating that affixing "legends on
share certificates indicating that the shares are subject to transfer restrictions" is "a technique commonly
used in the United States to put potential transferees... on notice of such restrictions).
'3 See KCC, art. 335.
137 See Young Moo Kim & Joel A Silverman, Legal Forms of Doing Business in Korea, in BUSINESS
LAWS IN KOREA 219 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 1988); Shin interview, supra note 81 (stating that the Korean
Securities Exchange Act requires that any valid and enforceable share transfer restriction provision be
removed prior to the occurrence of an IPO).
13s Song, supra note 13, at 843.
139 Id.
140 Kim& Silverman, supra note 137.
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stating that any transfer of shares must be approved by the board of
directors.' 41 In contrast with a shareholder agreement, any share transfer
made without obtaining the board approval would be unwound under Article
335, if such provisions and a separate board approval provision are stated in
the company charter. 1
42
B. Techniques Used to Implement Management Control Rights: Class
Voting Rights and Supermajority Voting Rights
U.S. venture investors also secure supplemental management control
rights in addition to traditional statutory rights under applicable general state
corporation law.' 43 The two most commonly used techniques include class
voting rights' 44 and supermajority voting rights. 145  These rights can be
effected through either an amendment of the articles of incorporation or by
creating separate contractual arrangements. 146 Generally, such techniques
confer a greater level of management control over the business affairs of the
venture business on the investors. 47 Both techniques are available in South
Korea but their overall effectiveness can be limited under the KCC.
1. Class Voting Rights
a. General treatment in the United States: class voting rights protect
investors by guaranteeing board representation or requiring their
approval on corporate decisions
When parties negotiate a typical venture capital transaction, they may
come to an accord that there will be certain matters for which the company
must obtain the approval of the preferred stockholders (i.e., venture
investors) voting as a separate class. 8 Class voting rights 49 in the articles
141 See KCC, art. 335, para. 1; see also KCC, art. 356 (stating that if the articles of incorporation
provide for the approval of board of directors for share transfers, each share certificate issued must contain
langua1e indicating that any transfer of shares shall be subject to the approval of the board of directors).
Choi interview, supra note 55.
'43 See Lebrun, supra note 133, at 223-24.
44 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
145 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
'4 See Lebrun, supra note 133, at 224.
47 Id. at 223-24.
14s Id. at 224; BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 464. These matters generally include board and
shareholder approval of significant business-related transactions, the election of board of directors, and
changes in the articles of incorporation that would adversely affect the preferred stock rights of the
investors.
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of incorporation are often used to guarantee the investors a certain level of
representation on the board of directors.150 In addition, such rights provide a
de facto veto right in connection with certain corporate transactions where
the investors would not have had the veto right had they voted with their
preferred stock on an as-converted-to-common stock basis.' Such rights
can further protect preferred stockholders' investment rights by recuiring
their approval in any adverse changes in the articles of incorporation.
b. Implementation under the KCC: class voting rights can only be
exercised in limited circumstances
Class voting rights are not expressly authorized in the KCC. Even if
class voting rights are utilized, it is unclear whether class voting provisions
are valid and enforceable under the KCC. Consistent with the principle of
shareholder democracy under Korean corporate law, Article 369 states that
"a shareholder shall have one vote for each share.' 53 Although Article 344
governs the issuance of various classes of shares, it does not expressly
delineate the respective voting rights for these classes. 154 Because these
silent provisions remain unclear, venture capital transactions in South Korea
probably have an uncertain level of statutory support for voting rights among
preferred stockholders compared to their U.S. counterparts. 
55
KCC Article 435, however, strongly implies that such rights exist.
This particular article makes class-based voting rights mandatory for holders
of preferred stock under one enumerated circumstance. 156 If a company has
issued two or more classes of shares, class-based voting is required on any
amendment to a company's articles of incorporation that may be deemed
prejudicial to such specific classes of shareholders. 157
149 Class-based voting rights are available under most U.S. state corporation laws. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 15 1(a) (noting that each class of stock may have "such voting powers, full or limited, or
no voting powers," as provided in the articles of incorporation).
! Lebrn, supra note 133, at 224.
151 Id. Cf. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 464 (stating that, on most general matters, the
investors and entrepreneurs vote together as one class (i.e., one vote for each common share into which the
preferred stock can be converted)).
152 See BAGLEY & DAUCHy, supra note 19, at 464.
"' See KCC, art. 369. But see MBCA § 7.2 1(a) (providing that "except as provided by [this Act] or
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled
to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders' meeting. Only shares are entitled to vote.").
"4 See KCC, art. 344.
'55 Choi interview, supra note 55; but see Lebrun, supra note 133, at 226 (stating that the use of class
voting rights in Japan is permissible under the Japanese Commercial Code, [SHOHO], art. 222-27).
s6 See KCC art. 435, para. 1.
117 Id. In the United States, there are similar analogous statutory provisions. Compare DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) with MBCA § 10.04.
VENTURE CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS IN SouH KOREA
In the venture capital context, then, any change in the articles of
incorporation which adversely affects existing investors' preferred stock
rights would require their separate approval in addition to the requisite,
ordinary approval by all the shareholders of the company.15 8  This article,
however, gives investors only partial protection because the separate
approval of investors is not statutorily required for corporate matters not
requiring an amendment to the articles of incorporation or other matters not
deemed prejudicial to preferred stockholders.15 9
2. Supermajority Voting Rights
a. General treatment in the United States: supermajority voting rights
allow investors to have de facto rights over certain corporate
decisions made by the company
Special voting provisions are commonly desired by venture investors
in U.S. transactions. One prevalent type is known as a supermajority voting
provision, which requires a higher-than-majority approval of either the
shareholders or the board of directors on certain corporate actions taken by
the venture business. 60 Such supermajority provisions are typically used in
stock redemptions exercised by the company, sales of substantially all of the
company's assets, a change-in-control merger, the election of a board of
directors, and increases in the company's authorized number of shares.161
In venture transactions, the investors' primary motivation for
negotiating a supermajority provision is to "set the voting requirement of
such approval at a level requiring [their] approval, thereby giving Jthem] a
defacto veto right with respect to the specified corporate action.",' 2 Many
state corporation laws in the United States permit the use of supermajority
provisions for the shareholders and the board of directors. 63 Typically,
158 This approval would presumably require the affirmative vote of no less than two-thirds of the
voting rights of the investors present at the general shareholder meeting and of no less than one-third of the
total outstanding shares of such class. See KCC, art. 435, para. 2.
159 Choi interview, supra note 55.
160 See Lebmn, supra note 133, at 226-27.
16' See id. at 226-27, 229; see BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 465.
162 See Lebrn, supra note 133, at 226.
16 In the United States, the articles of incorporation may provide for a greater voting requirement for
shareholders and the board of directors. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 7.27(a), 8.24(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
141(b), 216.
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supermajority voting provisions appear in the articles of incorporation."64 A
shareholder agreement, however, may also contain such provisions. 165
b. Implementation under the KCC: supermajority provisions can be
freely implemented, but may run the risk of being unenforceable if
they take the form ofprivate agreements
Supermajority voting rights provisions under the KCC are fully
enforceable, but are less desirable if incorporated into a private contractual
agreement. The KCC specifically allows the use of supermajority
requirement provisions if and when provided by the articles of
incorporation. With respect to the board of directors, Article 391 provides
that voting requirements may be increased by the articles of incorporation. 167
The default statutory rule requires that "[a] resolution of the board of
directors shall be adopted by the presence of the majority of directors in
office and the affirmative vote of the majority of directors present at the
meeting."'
168
Such voting requirements can successfully be instituted at the
shareholder level as well. Although Article 368 indicates that "resolutions
shall be adopted.., by affirmative votes of the majority of the voting rights
of shareholders present thereat and of at least [one-fourth] of the total
outstanding shares," it provides that this default requirement can be
overridden by the articles of incorporation.1 69 Accordingly, it is important
for venture investors working within the KCC to properly structure and
document supermajority provisions-at the shareholder and the board of
directors levels-in the company's articles of incorporation. One exception
is found in KCC Article 374, where higher-than-majority voting
requirements are mandated for certain statutorily enumerated corporate
actions. 17  For such actions, the KCC itself may be sufficient to protectinvestors' equity interests.171
164 See, e.g., John A. MacKerron, A Taxonomy of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 61
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 663, 677 n.116 (1993).
165 See Lebrun, supra note 133, at 229.
166 See KCC, art. 391; KCC, art. 368.
167 KCC, art. 391, para. 1.
1 6 id.
169 See KCC, art. 368.
170 See KCC, art. 374. Statutorily enumerated actions include: the transfer of the entire or an
important part of the business of the company, termination, alternation, or rescission of a lease contract or a
profit-sharing contract, and the takeover of the entire or parts of business of another company. Id.
171 Choi interview, supra note 55.
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Venture investors in South Korea should also consider whether
supermajority provisions should instead take the form of provisions in a
shareholder agreement. Investors in South Korea, similar to those in the
United States, 172 may find it desirable to rely upon private shareholder
agreements to secure certain voting rights 7 over certain corporate
actions.1 74 For example, a provision requiring the approval of a particular
investor might be better incorporated into a private shareholder agreement,
as opposed to the articles of incorporation. On the other hand, duplicating
supermajority provisions in the company charter is wise under Korean law
because contractual provisions in a shareholder agreement are only valid and
enforceable among the affected parties. 175 The downside to using a private
contractual provision is that in the event that voting provisions in a
shareholder agreement are breached, only money damages are available to
the injured party. 176
C. Techniques Used to Implement Investor Exit Rights: Redemption
Rights and Drag-Along/Tag-Along Rights
Venture investors in the United States rely on several legal techniques
when considering how they can "exit" their investments. The three most
common techniques are redemption rights, 77 tag-along/drag-along rights, 78
and registration rights. 79 With the exception of registration rights, the KCC
172 See REED & LAjOux, supra note 132, at 499 (noting that voting agreements in Delaware are valid
for ten years and can be extended any time within two years prior to expiration); see MBCA § 7.31
(explaining a shareholder's right to enter into voting agreement allowing two or more shareholders); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (stating that "the shares shall be voted as provided by the agreement").
173 For instance, provisions of either special approval of the investors or special elections of the board
of directors (through which one or more venture investors secure membership to the board of directors)
may be in a shareholder agreement as opposed a company's articles of incorporation.
'74 See In-Ho Cho, Shareholder Agreements in the U.S. Laws of Close Corporations and a Suggestion
for Future Korean Legislation 15, 49-52 (1987) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Washington
School of Law) (on file with author).
175 Shin interview, supra note 81.
176 Injunctive relief may be difficult to obtain from a Korean court. The most common remedy for
such investors is monetary damages. Choi interview, supra note 55.
177 See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
178 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
179 A registration right is the right to force the company to register the holder's stock with a national
securities exchange regulation office (in the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission) so
that the stock can be sold in the public securities markets. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 467-
70.
Venture investors usually demand a registration right so they can liquidate their stock and receive
their ultimate return on their investments. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 467. Although third
party acquisitions and private stock sales provide means of strategic exit for venture investors, the most
important and rewarding technique is the registration right via an IPO in a well-established stock market.
See also Smith, supra note 12, at 129-31; Lebrun, supra note 133, at 231.
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imposes statutory requirements on the use of each of these techniques. 180 In
South Korea, exercising redemption rights generally requires supermajority
voting approval, but unlawful transactions will not be unwound. Drag-
along/tag-along rights, on the other hand, are fully enforceable, but may
require specific board approval.
1. Redemption Rights
a. General treatment in the United States: redemption rights can ensure
that investors have a way to exit from their investments
In many venture capital transactions, venture investors require that
redemption rights be attached to their invested preferred stock.18' Investors
holding such redemption rights may force a company to repurchase its own
preferred stock at some given price and date in the future. 82  Redemption
rights help ensure that venture capital investors will have a way to exit from
their investment if the company fails.18
3
Redemption of shares or a corporate repurchase of issued shares is
widely practiced in the United States-most states authorize corporations to
redeem or repurchase their own shares. 84 The manner and propriety of
share redemption, however, are subject to statutorily and judicially imposed
restrictions.' s Today, U.S. law generally sanctions a share redemption if
made "out of surplus or out of earned surplus," [but] forbids it "only if
capital is impaired or [such redemption] will impair capital."' 86 For example,
Delaware General Corporation Law § 160(a) prohibits any redemption of
shares when "such purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of
the capital of the corporation." 187 For venture investors, however,
redemption rights may turn out to be virtually meaningless if the company
In South Korea, the overall stock market system has been improved greatly with the launch of
KOSDAQ on July 1, 1996, a secondary over-the-counter stock market modeled after NASDAQ, the over-
the-counter system in the United States. KOSDAQ was established primarily to support small businesses
and venture firms specializing in the high-tech and biotechnology areas. See Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the
IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17
BERKELEY J. IN'L L. 61, 75 (1999).
:so See KCC, arts. 335, 341, 343.81' See Smith, supra note 12, at 128-29.
182 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 453-55.
18 See Smith, supra note 12, at 128-29 (noting that redemption rights may also serve as "valuable
leverage" for the investors when dealing with the management over the course of the venture business).See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160; MBCA § 6.3 1(a).
Is MCDERMOrr, supra note 18, at 540.
196 id.
187 DEL CODEANN. tit. 8, § 160(a).
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has no cash or limited capital at the time of redemption because a company
may only use surplus capital to repurchase its own shares.
188
b. Implementation under the KCC: share redemption requires
supermajority voting approval, but unlawful transactions would not
be unwound
Although the KCC provides at least two different means for preferred
stockholders to exercise redemption rights18 9 in venture capital transactions,
redeeming venture investors in South Korea generally must meet certain
statutory requirements. 90 One method for venture investors to redeem their
shares is to force the company to purchase them with surplus capital.' 9'
However, investors are unlikely to redeem their preferred shares under this
scenario because the availability of considerable distributable profits
signifies that the company is successful and that the retention of their shares
will be profitable. When relying on this method, investors must ensure that
the price, time, and method of redemption are stated in the articles of
incorporation-not in a shareholder agreement-prior to the redeemable
preferred stock issuance.
92
In the more likely circumstance, where the venture company is
unlikely to succeed, investors seeking to liquidate their investments will rely
on the method involving reduction of capital. Redemption by this method is
more stringent because it requires the affirmative vote of no less than two-
thirds of the voting rights of the shareholders and of no less than one-third of
the total outstanding shares.' 93 In effect, investors force the company to
reduce its capital by amortizing their preferred shares by means of
purchasing and immediately canceling the shares with the approval of other
shareholders.1 94
188 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 453-55.
189 See Jae Woo Im, Acquisition of Own Shares: A Comparative Study of US. and Korean Laws 14-
15 (1996) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Washington School of Law) (on file with author). As a
matter of principle, Korean commercial law prohibits a company from purchasing or otherwise redeeming
its own shares.
'90 See generally KCC, ar. 341. Article 341 provides that a company may not acquire its own shares
except in the followings cases: (1) redemption of shares; (2) merger or acquisition of the entire business;
(3) where it is necessary to do so in exercising the corporation's rights; (4) fractional shares; and (5)
shareholders' right to request the company to redeem their shares. Id.
191 See Im, supra note 189, at 15.
'9 See KCC, art. 345, para. 2.
'9' See KCC, art. 343-2; KCC, art. 343.
'9 See KCC, art. 342.
APRIL 2004
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Under the KCC, however, share redemption transactions made
without the requisite voting approval would still be regarded as valid and
enforceable. Because the KCC does not expressly mention the legality of
share redemptions made in violation of its statutory provisions, most
scholars in Korea have vigorously debated their validity and
enforceability. 195 Nevertheless, Korean appellate courts have generally
regarded "unlawful" redemptions as void, but have held that such
transactions cannot be unwound.1 9 6 In such cases, the company's officers
and board members who caused or assented to such transactions are
generally liable for damages, and the shareholders may, on behalf of the
company, bring an action against such directors to claim damages. 197
2. Drag-Along/Tag-Along Rights
a. General treatment in the United States: drag-along/tag-along rights
can provide effective investment exit strategies for investors through
private sales
Another method of investment liquidation is the private sale of the
venture-invested company to third party investors. 198 Two common
techniques employed toward this endeavor are tag-along or co-sale rights
provisions and drag-along rights provisions. Tag-along rights are
contractual rights held by investors to sell their convertible preferred stock
alongside the entrepreneurs' common stock if the latter elect to sell their
common shares to an outside third party purchaser.' 99 This can be an
important investment exit strategy for venture investors owning a minority
stake in the investment when a substantial portion of the common stock held
by the entrepreneurs is being sold privately to an outside party. In contrast,
drag-along rights essentially give venture investors the right to force the
entrepreneurs to sell their common shares of the company should the
investors decide to sell their preferred shares to an outside purchaser.00 In
most U.S. venture capital transactions, these rights provisions often appear
:95 Ira, supra note 189, at 85-86.
96 id.
'9' Id. at 87.
" Smith, supra note 12, at 131-32.
99 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 19, at 470-71.
200 Id. at 471-72 (emphasizing that drag-along rights are often fiercely resisted by the entrepreneurs
and, if adopted, are usually not exercisable for a substantial period of time).
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in the form of a shareholder agreement made between the entrepreneurs and
investors.2 °1
b. Implementation under the KCC: drag-along/tag-along rights are fully
enforceable, but may require specific board approval
While the KCC does not prohibit the use of drag-along and tag-along
rights techniques, it imposes one important statutory restriction on outside
sales of shares by existing shareholders. KCC Article 335 provides that a
proposed transfer of shares must be approved by the board of directors
within one month after such proposal, if and when a provision requiring
board approval is provided in the articles of incorporation.20 2 Because the
ultimate effect of drag-along and tag-along rights is essentially a share
transfer, exercising such rights would fall under the rules stated in KCC
Article 335. Where board approval is required, but the board refuses to
approve a proposed share transfer, KCC Article 335-2 provides that a share
transferor may request that the board designate an alternate purchaser of
such shares.203 If the board fails to designate the purchaser, the transferor
may transfer his or her shares as originally proposed.20 4
Accordingly, although drag-along rights and co-sale rights provisions
are generally enforceable as a matter of private contractual agreement
between entrepreneurs and investors, 205 the negotiating parties should
always verify whether a board approval provision exists in the company's
charter. Drag-along or co-sale transfers made without board approval would
be deemed invalid and unenforceable if the provision exists in the company
charter.20 6 Alternatively, the parties can circumvent the effect of Article 355
by amending the company's articles of incorporation to remove any board
approval provision.
V. CONCLUSION
Virtually all of the techniques commonly used in U.S. venture capital
transactions can be implemented under the KCC. Although there are notable
differences between venture capital contracting documentation in South
201 See Smith, supra note 12, at 128.
202 See KCC, arts. 335, 335-2, para. 2.
203 See KCC, art. 335-2.
204 See KCC, art. 335-3, para. 2.
205 Choi interview, supra note 55.
206 id.
APRIL 2004
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Korea and the United States, with thorough planning and careful drafting,
the U.S. techniques can achieve their desired effect while complying with all
relevant KCC provisions.
Legal compliance is crucial because the techniques serve a dual
function. Not only do they legitimize convertible preferred stock rights
afforded to investors, but they also align the investors' financial incentives
with those of the entrepreneurs as the venture business moves forward. In
other words, legal compliance promotes mutual trust and cooperation
between investors and entrepreneurs and dissuades the parties from engaging
in intentional acts of breach.
However, legal practitioners in South Korea will likely face numerous
challenges. Because the KCC provisions are mandatory, successful
implementation of U.S. contracting techniques requires strict adherence to
its statutory requirements. Legal practitioners must therefore be cautious
when implementing U.S. techniques in venture capital transactions governed
by Korean law.
Where the KCC restricts or imposes limitations on the implementation
of such techniques, private shareholder agreements may be used to the
extent necessary to circumvent such statutory limitations. Reliance on
private agreements should be more appealing when legal practitioners decide
whether to document such techniques in the articles of incorporation or as
part of separate shareholder agreements: greater contractual freedom is well
suited to completing successful venture capital transactions. This method of
documentation, however, has an inherent and peculiar downside under
current Korean law, and thus requires sophistication and experience on the
part of legal practitioners working on such transactions.
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